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COMMENT ON RECENT CASES
AGENCY-AGENT BOUND HIMSELF ON CONTRACT WHiERE No

York] A recent decision of the New York
Court of Appeals deserves attention.' The receiver of a corporation
(plaintiff) applied to a broker for burglary insurance. Through
an intermediary the defendant agreed to provide the insurance.
He was the agent in New York of "London Lloyds." An application was handed to the defendant. It was headed "Underwriters
and Brokers' Emergency Agreement" and the form was stated to
be "provisional." Following other provisions was the word "Binding" and the signature: "Marsh-for Company."
No formal
policy was issued. Loss occurred.
London Lloyds do not issue insurance. A broker for one
wishing insurance posts the particulars. Underwriting members
may then subscribe the shares which they wish to take. When the
total is reached a policy is issued which binds only those who
underwrite. Accordingly the defendant had no principal so far
as the particular paper was concerned. Nevertheless, the "binder"
was held to be a present contract of insurance.
The plaintiff was one party to that contract. Who was the
other party? The New York court held that Marsh (defendant)
was the other party., Is this result satisfactory? It seems to be
despite the manner in which Marsh signed. Let it be conceded
that this probably violates the purpose which Marsh had in mind.
But if he did-not intend to contract for himself temporarily, with
perhaps an informal novation later on, what was his purpose?
Probably he did not think out his problem. The result is then
to hold Marsh rather than turn away the plaintiff without redress.
The facts do not seem to be controlled by Lyon v. Williams.2
There the agent signed "for the corporations" and there were
corporations for which he was authorized to make the particular
contract. For the same reason dicta
in certain English cases such
4
as Pike v. Ongley3 seem ineffective.
The New York court did not advert to the rule of implied varranty of authority as a basis upon which the plaintiff might have recovered. The appellate division thought that the action was brought
improperly on the contract of insurance; that it should have been
instituted "for breach of contract to insure" or "for fraud or for
falsely representing that he was agent for an insurance company."'
There seems to be no reason why the doctrine of implied warranty
PRINCIPAL.-[New

1. E lDee Clothing Co. v. Marsh (1928) 247 N. Y. 392, 160 N. E. 651.
2. (1856) 5 Gray (71 Mass.) 557.

3. (1887) 18 Q. B. Div. 708.
4. 1 Mechem "Agency" secs. 1174, 1175; see also 33 Harv. Law Rev. 591.
5. (1927) 220 App. Div. 701.

[376]

COMMENT ON RECENT CASES

of authority would not suffice. 6 There are no facts to show that
the plaintiff or its receiver had knowledge that Marsh had no
principal at the time the binder was signed.
There is a statement in the opinion of Andrews, J., which
should be challenged.
"The general rule may be stated that, where one party to a written
contract is known to the other to be in fact acting as agent for some
known principal, he does not become personally liable whether he signs
individually or as agent. Johnson v. Cate 77 Vt. 218, 59 At. 830."
This seems to state a point of view inconsistent with one of the
landmarks of the law of agency, Higgins v. Senior.7 Furthermore,
the declaration is not supported by the Vermont case. It does not
appear to be a case of a written contract but an oral contract of
sale. The written receipted bill which is therein mentioned appears to have been made some five years after the sale.
KENNETH
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CONSTITUTIONAL LAw-FoURTH AMENDMENT-TELEPHONE
WIRE-TAPPING AS A VIOLATION.-[United States] In Olmstead v.

United States" the charge was a conspiracy to violate the federal
Prohibition Act, and the evidence showed a huge enterprise doing a
business of $2,000,000 a year, and involving more than 100 persons,
with headquarters in Seattle. Part of the evidence consisted in conversations held by the conspirators over telephone wires running
from their offices and houses; the federal officers having attached
intercepting wires in the basement of the office building and in
the street near the homes.
Was this evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment? If yes, it was plainly inadmissible under Weeks v. United
Sta.tes2 and later rulings. No, answered five judges; Yes, answered
four.
The Chief Justice's opinion, for the majority, divides the
problem under four heads. First, this overhearing of telephonetalk was not a "search or seizure" under the terms of the amendment. Secondly, it did not become inadmissible on common law
grounds merely because illegal (if it were), because illegally obtained evidence is admissible, except when the illegality consists
in the violation of a constitutional provision. Thirdly, the illegality
of the act under a Washington state statute forbidding wiretapping did not affect the federal law of evidence. And, fourthly,
unethical methods of obtaining evidence do not afford ground for
excluding it.
6. Mechem "Agency" secs. 1373-1385 incl.; Tiffany "Agency" (2nd ed.)
pp. 344-349.

7. (1841) 8 M. & W. 834, followed in Gordon Malting Co. v. Bartels
Malting Co. (1912) 206 N. Y. 528.
1. 48 Sup. Ct. Rep. , June 4, 1928.
2. 232 U. S. 383, 34 Sup. Ct. Rep. 341.

